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ABSTRACT 
 
This Article is about the relationship between technology and society in 
fundamental rights theory. So far, the discussion about law and technology 
has generally been one-directional within the most relevant branches of the 
social sciences; scholars of the law have been treating technology as a black 
box when conducting their analyses or developing their theories. In turn, 
science and technology studies have considered law and regulation as a 
closed book, which is unsatisfactory as well. Reductionist and 
compartmentalized theorizing is particularly problematic when it comes to 
conceiving a fundamental rights theory that is able to cope with challenges 
of the Internet. Guided by Niklas Luhmann’s autopoietic systems theory, 
this Article offers novel perspectives that aim at theoretically explaining 
how affordances can be conceptualized within constitutional rights theory, 
with the focus on the freedom of the Internet.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The current discussion about the relationship between law and 
technology is unsatisfactory in the relevant branches of the social sciences. 
Legal scholars tend to treat technologies as a black box when conducting 
analyses or designing theories. Accordingly, they are blind to the role of 
affordances—that is, the opportunities for action that are built into an 
environment—in the relationship between law and technology. Scholars of 
science and technology studies (STS), in turn, have been treating law and 
regulation as a closed book rather than considering its built-in dynamics, 
which is also unsatisfactory. Reductionist and compartmentalized 
theorizing is particularly problematic when it comes to conceptualizing a 
fundamental rights theory that is able to cope with the challenges of the 
digital networked ecosphere. 
This Article attempts to develop a theory of “digital fundamental rights” 
that addresses the issue of affordances with regard to communicative 
freedom online. The contemporary discourse of fundamental rights practice 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss2/5
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generally focuses on civil liberties, conceived as individual rights in need 
of protection from state interference.2 However, over the last decades, an 
influential strand of philosophical legal thinking has been advocating for a 
replacement of the rights-conceived-as-liberties approach, with a new 
perspective that is conceiving rights as capabilities.3 Within this strand 
Amartya Sen4 and Martha Nussbaum5 display the most influential voices.6 
More recently, Julie Cohen has argued that this debate is unsatisfactory, in 
the networked environment, due to its failure to address the role of 
affordances in the exercise of fundamental rights. Rather than simply 
extending the rights-as-capabilities approach to the technological realm, she 
advocates a rights-as-affordances discourse that considers the socio-
technical constraints and affordances as preconditions for the exercise of the 
“freedoms and capabilities that people in fact enjoy.”7 To illustrate the 
implications of such an approach with an example, she refers to the 
discussion about privacy and data protection in the European Union.8 Cohen 
claims that the current debate in Europe tends to consider consent as the 
ultimate legitimation of privacy intrusions and finds this reasoning to come 
from a rights-as-liberties approach.9 Arguably, when adopting a rights-as-
affordances approach one would need to acknowledge that “effective data 
protection is first and foremost a matter of design.”10 She further argues that 
affordances would also need to be factored into a rights-as-capabilities 
approach.11 As a consequence, we would be required to ask about the socio-
technical conditions impacting the expansion of a person’s capabilities to 
 
 
2 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 172; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 
1948); Human Rights — Handbook for Parliamentarians, United Nations (2016), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HandbookParliamentarians.pdf. See generally Julie E. 
Cohen, Affording Fundamental Rights: A Provocation Inspired by Mireille Hildebrandt, 4 CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS LAW 78, 81-82 (2017). 
3 According to Amartya Sen, the “‘capabilities’ of persons to lead the kind of lives they value – 
and have reason to value” establish a focus for ethical valuation that is distinct from utilitarianism or 
resourcism. See AMARTYA K. SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 18 (2000). See also Peter Vallentyne, 
Debate: Capabilities Versus Opportunities for Well-Being, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 359 (2005). 
4 See, e.g., SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 3; Amartya Sen, Rights and Capabilities, 
in MORALITY AND OBJECTIVITY: A TRIBUTE TO J. L. MACKIE 130–48 (Ted Honderich ed., 1985). 
5 See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
APPROACH 31-36 (2011); Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
273 (1997). 
6 For an overview, see Vallentyne, supra note 3. 
7 Cohen, supra note 2, at 84. 
8 Id. at 87. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 See id. at 86-89. 
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lead the life she desired.12 A general shortcoming of the existing rights 
discourse, identified by Cohen, relates to the problem that almost all “smart 
technologies”13 are designed and controlled by the private sector while most 
legal regimes understand fundamental rights as a defence against state 
interference.14 Without developing this important argument any further she 
claims that a rights-conceived-as-affordances approach would be “an 
effective starting point” for an in-depth discussion of “the human rights 
obligations of private economic actors.”15 
Cohen’s approach has great merits as it reflects the practical effects of 
digital technologies as constraints and affordances of individual 
communication online and shows how both a rights-as-liberties approach 
and a rights-as-capabilities approach are unable to cope with some of the 
most pressing challenges of the digital reality. While in agreement with 
Cohen’s realism and her thesis that affordances must be taken seriously in 
the fundamental rights discourse, this Article responds to the identified 
practical challenges within a different conceptual framework that is 
grounded in Niklas Luhmann’s sociological systems theory.  
When formulated in the semantics of Luhmann’s theory, the history of 
fundamental rights development is not phrased in a language of 
discontinuities or ruptures, highlighting differences between rights 
conceived as liberties, capabilities or affordances. The focus of the theory 
is not on the form but on the function of fundamental rights, and an 
empirical perspective is as important as a normative one. Luhmann 
distinguishes between fundamental rights as institutions of the law and 
fundamental rights as institutions of society. As institutions of society, they 
guarantee continuity in the protection of individual and social autonomies 
against all hazards that, given social and technological conditions, may 
entail regardless of eventualities in the evolution of society. With regard to 
fundamental rights as institutions of the law, the central inquiry considers 
how society’s aim to promote and protect individual and social autonomies 
against digital challenges translates into the formal language of the law.  
Luhmann’s theorizing about society and the law is primarily descriptive. 
While the insights that may be gained from social science—informed 
observation and description of factual developments—are indispensable for 
 
 
12 See id. at 88. 
13 The term refers to artificial intelligence agents that are able to act autonomously. For a distinction 
of different levels of “smart” see MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, SMART TECHNOLOGIES AND THE END(S) OF 
LAW 22-23 (2015). 
14 See Cohen, supra note 2, at 89.  Cf. Chris Jochnick, Confronting the Impunity of Non-State 
Actors: New Fields for the Promotion of Human Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 56 (1999); David Kinley & 
Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations 
at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 931 (2004). 
15 Id. at 89. 
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a thorough analysis of the law’s ends in the networked environment, such a 
perspective is methodologically challenging. The question is how the 
knowledge gained within the descriptive context of social science can 
afterwards be transferred to the realm of legal practice, where normative 
conclusions are drawn and performative effects result. Such problems are 
reflected in a sub-discipline of legal science known as Sociological 
Jurisprudence. Eugen Ehrlich and Roscoe Pound, the pioneers of 
Sociological Jurisprudence, suggested resolving the problem by conceiving 
the science of legal practice as a subdomain of sociology.16 However, this 
“solution” only mystifies the fundamental distinction between “is” and 
“ought” and might be the effect of the two pioneers’ infatuation with a 
paradox: the paradox of Sociological Jurisprudence.17 This paradox cannot 
be resolved but only unfolded through drawing a distinction between a 
sociological perspective and a legal perspective. Accordingly, Sociological 
Jurisprudence should be examined as a two-step method of socio-legal 
analysis. The first step involves an empiric observation and description of 
real legal problems from the perspective of social science and social theory. 
While this is necessary to fully understand the social dimension of the legal 
problems at issue, a second step must follow aimed at a re-import of the 
gained insights back into the legal system. This second step requires a 
change of perspective from describing social facts to prescribing normative 
ends. Hence, it is necessary to reformulate insights gained from sociological 
observations in the language of the law. This methodological premise must 
be kept in mind while reading this Article. 
Smart technologies require the law to re-think the relationship between 
materiality and sociality. To achieve this within a framework of sociological 
systems theory, a first step is to emphasize that smart technologies are 
materialities which embody constraints or values affording social 
behaviour. The main challenge of a systems theory approach is that 
materialities have not been in the foreground of Luhmann’s 
communication-centred framework. Therefore, the key theoretical question 
is how the relationship between materiality and sociality should be 
conceived within autopoiesis theory.18 
 
 
16 See, e.g., EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 25 (Walter 
L. Moll trans., Transaction Publishers 2002) (1913); Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of 
Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 591, 594 (1911). 
17 The paradox of Sociological Jurisprudence consists in the impossibility to meld the law and the 
social sciences. See Gunther Teubner, Nach den Fällen: Paradoxien soziologischer Jurisprudenz, in DIE 
FÄLLE DER GESELLSCHAFT 227, 227 (Bertram Lomfeld ed., 2017). 
18 Niklas Luhmann conceives society as an autopoietic system, as something that is reproducing 
its elements out of its own elements. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS (John Bednarz & Dirk 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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This Article makes a case for a conceptualization of the Internet’s 
materiality within sociological systems theory that reflects the close 
interrelationship between the level of complexity of society’s current form 
of differentiation and the digital networked ecosystem. Part I applies the 
concept of affordances to the networked environment, illustrating through 
specific examples—such as the Twitter “hashtag” and ad-blocking 
technology—how affordances in the Internet are co-determined in dynamic, 
recursive processes of material design and social interpretation. Part II 
situates the concept of affordances within Luhmann’s theory of sociological 
systems. Part III describes how the Internet correlates with social 
organizations and institutions in creating complexity but also in providing 
strategies for managing that complexity. Building on these assertions, Part 
IV discusses the implications for fundamental rights theory in general and 
the need to recognize a new fundamental freedom that specifically protects 
the Internet as an institution. 
Accordingly, the purpose of this Article is twofold. First, it aims at 
locating the Internet within sociological systems theory and, second, it 
endeavours to show that from this perspective entirely new insights can be 
gained for fundamental rights theory in contemporary society.  
 
PART I: AFFORDANCES, SOCIETY AND THE NET 
 
 The Internet is the setting for a technological drama, where affordances 
are determined by dynamic, recursive processes of material design and 
social interpretation.  This Part explains the concept of affordances and 
applies it to the Internet, illustrating through modern-day examples the 
process by which opportunities presented by the networked environment are 
shaped and reshaped. 
 
PART I: A. THE CONCEPT OF AFFORDANCES 
“Affordance” is a term that lacks precise conceptual contours. It was 
coined by the perceptual psychologist James Gibson in 1979.19 For Gibson, 
animals are equipped to perceive information in their environment 
selectively, depending on the information’s relevance to the animal’s 
survival. Within this scheme, the environment’s affordances (opportunities 
or invitations) are considered to be functionally relevant information for the 
living system.20 Ten years later the concept was appropriated and 
 
 
Baecker trans., 1995) (1984). 
19 See JAMES J. GIBSON, THE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO VISUAL PERCEPTION (1979); see also 
Ian Hutchby, Technologies, Texts and Affordances, 35 SOCIOLOGY 441, 447 (2001). 
20 See Leah A. Lievrouw, The Materiality of Mediated Knowledge and Expression, in MEDIA 
TECHNOLOGIES 21, 48 (Tarleton Gillespie et al. eds., 2014). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss2/5
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popularized by Donald Norman, a designer.21 According to Norman, the 
term “affordance” refers to the design aspects of an object, “primarily those 
fundamental properties that determine just how the thing could possibly be 
used.”22 This definition suggests a deterministic approach to technology. 
The “design constituency”23—that is, the designer, or group of designers, 
who creates an artifact—is considered to determine the range of the object’s 
potential uses. The possibility of flexibility in the user response to the 
original design options is not part of the equation. Although Norman later 
corrected some of the original version’s ambiguities, this definition spread 
widely in the relevant scholarship.24 Norman’s original definition is still 
methodologically useful as it uncovers the pitfalls of technological 
determinism.25 Contrary to Norman’s belief, the original design of a 
material object or technology does not determine its possible use, as 
affordances are “inherently multiple”.26 There is always flexibility—not 
only in the design of a technology but also in its reception. The flexibility 
in the design of a technology results from design constituencies being able 
to choose the politics/values that a certain technology embodies when it is 
created. But there is also flexibility in the way the “impact constituency”27 
can interpret a technology. 
An example of this flexibility is the hashtag, which was suggested by 
Twitter’s impact constituency in 2007 as a means of structuring discourse 
on the microblogging platform.28 In a tweet from August 23, 2007, Chris 
Messina asked the Twitter community, “[H]ow do you feel about using # 
(pound) for groups. As in #barcamp [msg]?”29 This was the birth of the 
hashtag on Twitter, the “hash” being the # sign and the “tag” a specific 
keyword such as “netneutrality.” While the hashtag sign had been used 
before inter alia as an annotation referring to channels of Internet Relay Chat 
 
 
21 See DONALD A. NORMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY THINGS (1988); see also Lievrouw, 
supra note 20, at 48. 
22 NORMAN, supra note 21, at 8. 
23 Bryan Pfaffenberger, Technological Dramas, 17 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 282, 283 (1992). 
24 See Donald A. Norman, Affordance, Conventions, and Design, 6 INTERACTIONS 38, 42 (1999); 
see also Joanna McGrenere & Wayne Ho, Affordances: Clarifying and Evolving a Concept, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF GRAPHICS INTERFACE 2000, at 179, 184 (2000). McGrenere and Ho consider the wide 
spread of Norman’s flawed original definition to be the primary reason why many versions of the 
concept’s definition proliferated and why the concept lacks clarity today. 
25 See Lievrouw, supra note 20, at 27. 
26 Pfaffenberger, supra note 23, at 284. 
27 Id. at 296. 
28 See Alex Leavitt, From #FollowFriday to YOLO: Exploring the Cultural Salience of Twitter 
Memes, in TWITTER AND SOCIETY 137, 137 (Katrin Weller et al. eds., 2014). 
29 Chris Messina (@chrismessina), TWITTER (Aug. 23, 2007, 12:25 PM), 
https://twitter.com/chrismessina/status/223115412. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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(IRC),30 the innovative element of Messina’s contribution was to convince 
the Twitter community of its usefulness as a means of indexing microblogs 
and grouping conversations.31 Adding the hashtag “#netneutrality” to a 
tweet allows the marking and contextualizing of communication through 
metadata that relates the post to a new or ongoing Twitter-discussion about 
net neutrality.32 Messina described the advantage of the hashtag as 
representing “a solid convention for coordinating ad-hoc groupings and 
giving people a way to organize their communications in a way that the tool 
(Twitter) does not currently afford.”33 The hashtag’s innovation consisted 
of the possibility of structuring a conversation on Twitter without the need 
to follow a particular Twitter user. This is an example of user innovation 
that greatly improved Twitter’s significance for public communication and 
which was later officially incorporated into the platform’s architecture by 
Twitter Inc.34 It demonstrates how an impact constituency may be able to 
respond to a technology’s affordances. Although things have prescriptive 
capacities35 that may enlist users into a certain role, they do not have innate 
regulatory aims. Rather than having built-in agency (or politics36), there is 
plasticity in the design of material things.37  
 
PART I: B. THE TECHNOLOGICAL DRAMA SHAPING AFFORDANCES 
Artifacts, including technologies of the Internet, are shaped by 
accompanying interpretations in a discursive process that Bryan 
Pfaffenberger calls “technological drama.”38  
The technological drama is a theory describing “a discourse of 
technological ‘statements’ and ‘counterstatements’”39 that is supposed to 
explain interactions between the social and the material when technologies 
 
 
30 See Liz Gannes, The Short and Illustrious History of Twitter #Hashtags, GIGAOM (Apr. 30, 
2010), https://gigaom.com/2010/04/30/the-short-and-illustrious-history-of-twitter-hashtags/. 
31 See Alexander Halavais, Structure on Twitter: Social and Technical, in TWITTER AND SOCIETY, 
supra note 28, at 29, 36. 
32 See also Axel Bruns & Jean E. Burgess, The Use of Twitter Hashtags in the Formation of Ad 
Hoc Publics, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL RESEARCH (ECPR) 
GENERAL CONFERENCE 2011 (2011), http://eprints.qut.edu.au/46515/. 
33 Chris Messina, Twitter Hashtags for Emergency Coordination and Disaster Relief, FACTORY 
JOE (Oct. 22, 2007), https://factoryjoe.com/2007/10/22/twitter-hashtags-for-emergency-coordination-
and-disaster-relief/. 
34 See also Bruns & Burgess, supra note 32, at 2. 
35 See Bruno Latour, Where are the Missing Masses?: The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artefacts, 
in SHAPING TECHNOLOGY/BUILDING SOCIETY 225, 232–40 (Wiebe E. Bijker & John Law eds., 1992). 
36 See Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121 (1980). 
37 See Trevor J. Pinch & Wiebe E. Bijker, The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts: Or How 
the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other, in THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 17 (Wiebe E. Bijker et al. eds., 1987). 
38 Pfaffenberger, supra note 23 at 285. 
39 Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss2/5
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are designed and received by different constituencies. The drama 
reconstructs the design and reception of an artifact as recursive interactions 
between materiality and sociality. According to Pfaffenberger, “the 
reciprocal construction of political aims and artifacts” is “coupled with the 
deliberate fabrication of controlled social contexts.”40 As ideal-types, three 
processes or acts can be distinguished in a technological drama, including 
technological regularization, technological adjustment and technological 
reconstitution. The drama starts with technological regularization—that is, 
the creation of a technological artifact by the design constituency. The 
newly designed artifact has no meaning until it is interpreted by the design 
constituency in a discursive process. At this stage, meaning is implanted 
into the artifact in such a way that some of its technical features embody a 
political aim.41 This is the process that Pfaffenberger describes as the 
establishment of a cultural mythos that is a dominant view in society about 
what a certain technology is and what it can do. Through the establishment 
of the mythos, the design constituency tries to define alternative 
interpretations away.42 Irrespective of the design constituency’s efforts to 
take “logonomic control”43 of the artifact’s social context, ambiguities will 
always subsist.  
Remaining ambiguities can be exploited by the impact constituency in 
the second act of “technological adjustment.” At this stage, the impact 
constituency constructs alternative interpretations and tries to establish a 
“counter mythos” of what the technology is or can do. The call to use the 
hashtag on Twitter for the purpose of discourse structuring is an example 
illustrating a process of technological adjustment. While such a process 
does not involve a change in the technology, the ensuing stage of 
technological reconstitution consists of a material redesign of the 
technology through the impact constituency. 
Regarding reconstitution, the drama’s third act, an example is the 
emergence of technology allowing users to block advertisements on the 
websites they visit.44 Ad-blocking technology was created as a “counter 
artifact”45 with the purpose of technically reconstituting the functionality of 
behaviour-tracking cookies. According to Helen Nissenbaum, the 
 
 
40 Id. at 291. 
41 See id. 
42 See Pfaffenberger, supra note 23 at 295. 
43 Id. at 296. 
44 Online Advertising: Block Shock: Internet Users Are Increasingly Blocking Ads, Including on 
Their Mobiles, ECONOMIST (June 6, 2015), https://www.economist.com/news/business/21653644-
Internet-users-are-increasingly-blocking-ads-including-their-mobiles-block-shock. 
45 Pfaffenberger, supra note 23, at 304. 
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advertising industry’s lobbying backed the introduction of the so-called 
“third-party” cookie by decision RFC 2965 of the Internet Engineering Task 
Force in 1997.46 The “third-party” cookie turned out to be particularly 
invasive on people’s privacy as it allows websites to follow people even 
when they visit new websites. Ad-blocking technology can be seen as a 
technical answer to “third-party” cookies. While AdBlock Plus, a creation 
of Eyeo, an Internet company, is the most widely used ad-blocker, many 
other companies are also producing such software.47 The meaning and value 
of the counter artifact, however, does not come from such companies but 
from those who are negatively affected by the original technology—in the 
case of ad-blocking, the myriad of users who feel annoyed by intrusive 
online-advertisements.  
Pfaffenberger shows that the fabrication of a counter artifact can 
sometimes shift from technological reconstitution to regularization, the first 
act of a new technological drama. As ad-blocking makes online publishers 
lose money, several such companies, including Axel Springer, Spiegel 
Online and Süddeutsche Zeitung sued Eyeo in the German courts.48 In what 
can be seen as a new act of technological adjustment, Eyeo then offered a 
compromise, authorizing net publishers who were willing to pay Eyeo six 
percent of their revenues, to integrate a tag on their websites that let selected 
ads appear.49 Hence the technology changed from blocking any advertising 
to selecting ads that—for whatever reason—were not considered as bad. 
Eyeo, for their part, were busy explaining this move through the creation of 
a countermyth of their software arguing that:  
[W]e have learned that most users wouldn’t mind seeing better, 
more informative ads. In fact, the majority of people we’ve talked 
to are keenly aware that advertising plays a pivotal role in keeping 
content online free. Trouble is, most Internet ads are still low on 
quality and high on annoyance, and the two sides – users and 
advertisers – rarely come together. That’s where we come in. We 
find ourselves uniquely positioned to broker a compromise that 
makes the Internet better for all parties. We aim to make the entire 
 
 
46 See Helen Nissenbaum, From Preemption to Circumvention: If Technology Regulates, Why Do 
We Need Regulation (and Vice Versa)?, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1367, 1382 (2011). 
47 See ECONOMIST, supra note 44. 
48 See, e.g., Oberlandesgericht München [Munich Higher Regional Court], Case No. 29 U 1917/16 
(Aug. 17, 2017); Oberlandesgericht Köln [Cologne Higher Regional Court], Case No. 6 U 149/15 (June 
24, 2016); Landesgericht München [Munich Regional Court], Case No. 33 O 5017/15 (Mar. 22, 2016); 
Landgericht Köln [Cologne Regional Court], Case No. 33 O 132/14 (Sept. 29, 2015). 
49 See Adblock-Plus-Macher reichen Medien die zweite Hand, NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG (Sept. 13, 
2016), https://www.nzz.ch/digital/streit-um-werbeblocker-adblock-plus-macher-reichen-medien-die-
zweite-hand-ld.116408. 
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ecosystem more sustainable by encouraging true innovation and 
non-intrusive ad standards, on the one end, and a better user 
experience on the other.50 
The counter mythos that Eyeo was suggesting focuses on a trade-off 
between information and annoyance. The success of this suggestion is, 
however, doubtful as it is easy to see that Eyeo is a company that wants to 
make money, and the introduction of whitelists is essential to secure their 
business model. It is no surprise therefore that the drama continues and the 
suggested mythos is rejected by websites which are not willing to pay a fee. 
While some websites develop software that blocks users who block their 
ads, others ask their audience to voluntarily accept ads as a contribution to 
high-quality news reporting.51  
For Pfaffenberger “the drama can drop out of the technology.”52 This 
would be a stage of “designification”53 which can be reached when, because 
of unforeseen technological or social reasons, the recursively intertwined 
dynamics come to an end. For Nissenbaum this would be a dangerous stage 
because people would then be “inclined to accept that technology is neutral” 
and “forget that there are values or politics involved in technology at all.”54 
Thus, Pfaffenberger’s theory paves the way to a conceptualization of 
affordances that avoids technological determinism. On the other hand, the 
concept of affordance stands clear from a social constructivist perspective 
claiming “that technological artefacts, in both their form and their meaning, 
are socially shaped, as opposed to being the clearly defined products of 
particular inventors or innovators.”55 Rather, affordances of technology are 
conceived to be co-determined in recursive practices of material design and 
social interpretation.56  
 
PART II: LUHMANN’S SYSTEMS THEORY AND THE INTERNET 
 
 
This Part examines how the concept of affordances, applied to the 
Internet in Part I, fits into the sociological systems theory of Niklas 
Luhmann, beginning with an overview of the basic contours of that theory.  
 
 
50 See EYEO: OUR MISSION, https://eyeo.com/ (last visited May 4, 2017). 
51 See ECONOMIST, supra note 44. 
52 Pfaffenberger, supra note 23, at 308. 
53 Id. 
54 Nissenbaum, supra note 46, at 1379. 
55 Hutchby, supra note 19, at 441. 
56 See also Lievrouw, supra note 20, at 48. 
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 Luhmann’s sociological systems theory provides one of the most 
sophisticated analyses of contemporary society and its legal system. 
Because of the strong focus on the social and the marginalisation of the 
material that is characteristic of Luhmann’s writings the question is how 
autopoiesis theory is able to cope with the challenges that technological 
affordances pose for social and legal theorizing.  
For Luhmann, society is an autopoietic system—a system reproducing 
its elements autonomously out of its own elements.57 The elements of a 
social system are communications and not humans or actions of humans or 
other agents.58 This does not mean that autopoiesis theory is dehumanized, 
as some of Luhmann’s critics have claimed,59 but rather that humans are not 
a system. For Luhmann, a human being is a structural coupling of 
phenomenologically different systems. Her body is a biological system, her 
consciousness a psychic system and human communications are 
components of the social system.60 Luhmann conceives communicative 
interactions between people as a structural coupling of psychic systems, 
providing for a situation of coevolution through mutual observation. Any 
selection in a communicative process, as discussed later, in Part II.A, is 
contingent. Since at least two processors of communication must be 
involved in any interaction there is double contingency.61 As a result, 
communication in interaction systems cannot be conceived as a simple 
transmission of information between two parties.62 Interactions are closed 
systems; the communication between the involved people can only be 
understood within the context of the system. A stranger approaching an 
ongoing interaction would need some introduction to its “history” to be able 
to participate.63  
To understand how affordances—specifically, affordances in the 
Internet—fit into this theory, it is important to first understand how 
Luhmann understood communication and its relationship to social systems. 
 
 
 
 
57 See LUHMANN, supra note 18, at 37 (John Bednarz & Dirk Baecker trans., 1995) (1984). 
58 See Hugh Baxter, Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Autopoietic Legal Systems, 9 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 167, 176 (2013); see also HANS-GEORG MOELLER, THE RADICAL LUHMANN 19–24 (2012) 
(providing a more detailed analysis of Luhmann’s theory). 
59 See, e.g., Oliver Lepsius, Steuerungsdiskussion, Systemtheorie und Parlamentarismuskritik 
(1999); Matthias Mahlmann, Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie 241 (4th ed. 2016). 
60See MOELLER, supra note 58, at 23. 
61 See LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 18, at ch. 2. 
62 See Niklas Luhmann, The Form of Writing, 9 STAN. LITERATURE REV. 25, 27 (1992). 
63 See Niklas Luhmann, The Autopoiesis of Social Systems, in SOCIOCYBERNETIC PARADOXES 172, 
177 (R. F. Geyer & J. van der Zouwen eds., 1986). 
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PART II: A. WHAT IS COMMUNICATION?  
For Luhmann, communication is the only genuinely social operation.64 
It is not humans who communicate, only communications can 
communicate. Communication is not a “speech act”65 and it is not produced 
by language—he explicitly rejects structuralist assumptions, which focus on 
the structure of linguistic signs rather than their function.66 Luhmann defines 
communication as the synthesis of three selections: the selection of 
“utterance,” the selection of “information,” and the selection of 
“understanding.”67 In a communication process, the distinctions of utterance 
and information of the first communication are understood by the second 
one. While an utterance is an act of expression, information refers to the 
distinction between the act and its content and can be explained as a 
difference between medium and form.68 Luhmann uses the word “medium” 
in this context to describe something that we normally call “substance.”69 A 
medium stands for something loosely coupled and needs to be distinguished 
from a form, which is a substance with more strongly coupled elements.70 
Thus, form can always be the medium for something else that is becoming 
form. The light of a candle, for example, is a medium that becomes form 
when it shines through the lenses and painted slides of a Magic Lantern and 
is projected onto a wall. Information is an utterance that has gained form. 
The selection of information in the first communication involves a decision 
about the meaning of the selected utterance. Hence, information does not 
pre-exist as a completed unit in the world but is internally constructed in a 
communicative process as a result of a selection. The third selection, 
understanding, is the synthesis of the previous two selections and involves 
the re-entry of the form into another form. Understanding occurs in the 
second communication when the distinction between utterance and 
information of the first communication is put into a new form, itself 
involving a distinction between utterance and information. Communication 
 
 
64 See 1 NIKLAS LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY 42 (Rhodes Barrett trans., 2012) (1997). 
65 Luhmann, The Form of Writing, supra note 62, at 27. 
66 See Luhmann, The Autopoiesis of Social Systems, supra note 63, at 174.  Structuralist approaches 
are premised on “the belief that phenomena of human life are not intelligible except through their 
interrelations,” and that “these relations constitute a structure, . . . behind local variations [of which] . . 
. are constant laws of abstract structure.”  SIMON BLACKBURN, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 
(2d ed. 2008).  See, e.g., FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (Roy Harris 
trans., 1983) (1916). 
67 Id. at 175. 
68 See LARS QVORTRUP, THE HYPERCOMPLEX SOCIETY 143 (2003). 
69 See id. at 111. 
70 See Luhmann, The Form of Writing, supra note 62, at 31. 
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thus happens in social systems as the understanding distinction between 
utterance and information.71 In other words, when a first communication 
expresses something, this involves two selections about utterance and 
information and the second communication’s understanding is the third 
selection.72 Hence, understanding is an internal process, which is the result 
of the application of a social system’s own criteria for selection. There is no 
input or output of components into the social system or transfer of 
information, as many communication theories suggest.73 
 
PART II: B. TYPES OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS  
Interactions and society are different types of social systems. People 
communicate in interaction systems and their communications must take 
account of their communicative environment.74 Societies however cannot 
communicate with their environment since that would presuppose the 
inclusion of the “understanding partner in the system.”75 The existence of a 
sub-system of society implies a distinction between the system and its 
environment that is based on communicative characteristics. For Luhmann, 
the distinction between system and environment is a form with two sides 
that are intrinsically bound up with each other.76 Every system constitutes 
itself according to one specific difference and everything that is not part of 
the system is in the environment. Systems are operatively closed, which 
implies that for their reproduction they just monitor their own operations 
and exclude everything else. Within society, a number of sub-systems have 
become differentiated. They differ from each other in the specific function 
that they fulfil within society. Some of the most important systems that 
Luhmann distinguishes in his writings include the law, politics, the 
economy, science, art, religion, education, mass media and family. 
It is not only humans and brains but also material objects that are 
excluded from society.77 This is one of the reasons why Luhmann’s theory 
has been accused by the German media theorist Friedrich Kittler and some 
of his sympathizers of being “technologically blind.”78 Although Luhmann 
 
 
71 See Luhmann, The Autopoiesis of Social Systems, supra note 63, at 183. 
72 See QVORTRUP, supra note 68, at 143. 
73 For a reconstruction of four main models of communication that are based on the 
sender/medium/receiver-differentiation, see id. at 126–32. 
74 See Luhmann, The Autopoiesis of Social Systems, supra note 63, at 177. 
75 Id. at 176. 
76 See Baxter, supra note 58, at 176. 
77 See NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 67 (Klaus Alex Ziegert trans., 2004) (1993); 
LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY, supra note 64, at 28. 
78 See, e.g., Vagias Karavas, The Force of Code: Law's Transformation under Information-
Technological Conditions, 10 GERMAN L.J. 463 (2009); Geoffrey Winthrop-Young & Nicholas Gane, 
Friedrich Kittler: An Introduction, 23 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 5 (2006); Geoffrey Winthrop-
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argues that neither brains nor machines communicate, he specifies that 
computers enable the production of structural couplings between 
consciousness and communication.79 To understand how computers and the 
Internet are important for communication and the social system, it is 
necessary to recall that Luhmann distinguishes three types of media: 1) 
language, 2) symbolically generalized communication media (success 
media) and 3) distribution media.80 Meaning is the most important success 
medium of society, and both psychic systems and communicative systems 
use meaning for their own reproduction. In the sense of the media/form 
dichotomy, social systems use meaning as a form for the production of 
communications. Computers, for their part, do not belong to the sphere of 
communication—they are machines, Luhmann’s fourth category of 
systems.81 The networked computer is a distribution medium.82 
Consequently, a network of computers serves as a distribution medium in a 
similar way that the printing press, telegraph, telephone or broadcasting 
media have been crucial means for the distribution of meaning.  
 
PART II: C. PARTICULARITY OF THE INTERNET  
The particularity of the Internet is that it couples the functions of a 
distribution medium with those of a success medium, constituting a 
morphologically hybrid network of material things and communication. The 
material sphere and the sphere of communication are integrated into one 
communicative structure and both spheres interact with each other without 
either part being able to determine the other. It is exactly here where the 
theory of affordances, developed in Part I, can be connected with 
sociological systems theory. The technology of the Internet affords certain 
uses that in turn impact on the communications that are taking place over 
the network of computers. 
Accordingly, the Internet is not a social system83 and it does not 
directly produce meaning. Rather, by the networking of computers, the 
 
 
Young, Silicon Sociology, or, Two Kings on Hegel's Throne?: Kittler, Luhmann, and the Posthuman 
Merger of German Media Theory, 13 YALE J. CRITICISM 391, 409 (2000). 
79 See LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY, supra note 64, at 65–66. 
80 See LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 18, at 160–61; LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY, 
supra note 64, at 120–23. 
81 See LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 18, at 2. 
82 See Dirk Baecker, Niklas Luhmann in the Society of the Computer, 13 CYBERNETICS & HUM. 
KNOWING 25, 29 (2006). 
83 But see Peter Bøgh Anderson, WWW as Self-Organizing System, 5 CYBERNETICS & HUM. 
KNOWING 5 (1998). 
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Internet materially designs the continuous linking up of communicative 
events.84 For Luhmann, events are created by a social system and not, for 
example, by the physical environment or human or artificial agents. Events 
exist only for a limited time span—they “vanish soon after they appear.”85 
Their duration is a matter of definition and will depend on decisions taken 
by the autopoietic system itself. While events belong to the social realm it 
is the electronic actions of the material network that afford events to follow 
upon events. Hence the Internet is co-determined by the social and the 
material to build structures constituting a hybrid network of events that 
reproduces itself.86 Events not only distinguish between system and 
environment but also connect a system with a concrete situation, and the 
distinction between event and situation allows a system or other observer to 
“see the difference between system and environment as the structure of the 
situation.”87  
If events are recursively used to produce new events and the new event 
must be different from the previous one, how then do social systems 
maintain themselves? As seen, structures of social systems are dynamic in 
the sense that they are built on events dying soon after appearance. Although 
events cannot be protected against dissolution, their structure-generating 
power can be preserved by memory, script, printing press or other 
distribution media such as the Internet.88 The material affordances of text as 
a mechanical storage medium differ from those of a computer hard disk 
inasmuch as the latter requires digital code as an intermediary to make the 
stored information readable at all.89 Computer code affords interweaving of 
sound, language, script, printed text, still or moving images, and 
combinations of everything. Combined with the read/write interfaces of 
Web 2.0,90 this leads to a hyper connectivity that highly exceeds the 
complexity of text.91 While external patterns can be helpful for the social 
system’s maintenance, Luhmann insists that these patterns are not produced 
by the social system—the purpose of the social system is to produce 
events.92  
 
 
84 See Christoph B. Graber, Bottom-up Constitutionalism: The Case of Net Neutrality, 7 
TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 524 (2017); see also DAN WIELSCH, ZUGANGSREGELN: DIE 
RECHTSVERFASSUNG DER WISSENSTEILUNG 236–38 (2008). 
85 QVORTRUP, supra note 68, at 168. 
86 See Luhmann, The Autopoiesis of Social Systems, supra note 63, at 174. 
87 Id. at 181. 
88 See id. at 180. 
89 See 4 THOMAS VESTING,, DIE MEDIEN DES RECHTS 54 (2015). 
90 For a definition, see infra note 129  and accompanying text. 
91 See id. at 53; see also INT’L PANEL ON SOC. PROGRESS, CHAPTER 13: MEDIA AND 
COMMUNICATIONS 27 (2016), https://comment.ipsp.org/chapter/chapter-13-media-and-
communications. 
92 See Luhmann, The Autopoiesis of Social Systems, supra note 63, at 181. 
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PART II: D. HYPERCOMPLEXITY 
According to Luhmann, we live in a hypercomplex society—that is, a 
society which is based on second order observation. In Theory of Society, 
he explains that hypercomplex systems arise when one observer describes 
another observer’s description of society.93 While early modern society 
stands out as a social structure that is governed through anthropocentric 
rationality, contemporary society is functionally differentiated in many 
systems with different rationalities in a polycontextural world.94 The 
rationality of a system is embedded in its binary code and one specific 
binary code is at the basis of every social system. While the law, for 
example, observes itself in its environment through the distinction between 
legal and illegal, the political code juxtaposes the values of power and not 
power and the economy operates a code distinguishing between necessary 
and unnecessary payments, and so forth. As there are many system 
rationalities, there is no Archimedean vantage point from where social 
complexity in its entirety could be observed. Modern anthropocentrism has 
been replaced by polycentrism in the hypercomplex society.95 Since each 
system is an observer permanently observing other observers in its 
environment, which are themselves observing systems, the complexity is 
overwhelming. In addition, Luhmann refers to the “temporalisation of 
complexity.”96 Under conditions of technology-enhanced social 
acceleration, complexity is not only to be considered in the dimension of 
space but also in the dimension of time.97 In a high-speed society, the 
contraction of time-horizons makes it more challenging to make informed 
decisions.98 All in all, there is an urgent need for contemporary society to 
develop adequate strategies for complexity management.  
 
PART II: E. COMPLEXITY MANAGEMENT 
Formal organizations and institutions are responsible for complexity 
 
 
93 See LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY, supra note 64, at 80; 2 NIKLAS LUHMANN, THEORY OF 
SOCIETY 173, 183 (Rhodes Barrett trans., 2013) (1997); see also LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra 
note 18, at 471. 
94 See NIKLAS LUHMANN, OBSERVATIONS ON MODERNITY (William Whobrey trans., 1998). 
95 See QVORTRUP, supra note 68, at 6–7. 
96 Niklas Luhmann, Temporalization of Complexity, in SOCIOCYBERNETICS: AN ACTOR-ORIENTED 
SOCIAL SYSTEMS APPROACH 95 (R. F. Geyer & Johannes van der Zouwen eds., 1978). 
97 See Riccardo Prandini, The Future of Societal Constitutionalism in the Age of Acceleration, 20 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 731 (2013). 
98 See id. at 754. 
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reduction in society. According to Luhmann, formal organizations and 
institutions are means that social systems develop for their internal 
differentiation. A formal organization—a third type of social system to be 
distinguished besides interactions and societies99—is a social system that 
places itself between society and the individual interaction system.100 A 
formally organized system is based on membership, which is self-
referentially coupled with certain entry conditions.101 Specific success 
media—such as property and political power—act as catalysts for building 
systems in the form of organizations.102 The point is that expectations of the 
organization can vary independently of those of its members. Under 
conditions of double contingency and acceleration, rules of membership 
thus allow for sustainably reproducing highly artificial expectations.103 
Institutions are a second solution for complexity reduction that society has 
developed. An institution is a set of behavioural expectations that can count 
on social consensus.104 Institutions become meaningful when people 
interpret their roles in society. They are thus an important element not only 
for coordination in the interaction system and in society but also for 
channelling expectations and thus complexity reduction. Fundamental 
rights are an example of an institution of the legal system. Fundamental 
rights bundle normative expectations that are related to the protection of 
individual and social autonomies.  
Although there are no direct connections, the Internet is interrelated 
with the level of complexity of society’s current form of differentiation. 
Arguably, there is a parallelism in the organizational structure between 
society and the Internet. The thesis, developed in Part III, is that the Internet 
represents strategies for complexity management that are analogous in their 
function to formal organizations and institutions. 
 
PART III: THE MATERIALITY OF THE NET AND THE STRUCTURE-
GENERATING POWER OF COMMUNICATIVE EVENTS 
 
This Part describes how, although the Internet correlates with social 
organizations and institutions in creating complexity, it also provides 
effective strategies for managing that complexity. 
The beginnings of this thesis can be found in the work of Lars 
Qvortrup, who builds on Luhmann’s sociological systems theory.  Qvortrup 
 
 
99 See LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 18, at 2, 15. 
100 See 2 NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOZIOLOGISCHE AUFKLÄRUNG 13–14 (1975). 
101 See LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 18, at 196–97.  
102 NIKLAS LUHMANN, MACHT 99 (1975). 
103 See LUHMANN, SOZIOLOGISCHE AUFKLÄRUNG, supra note 100, at 14. 
104 See NIKLAS LUHMANN, GRUNDRECHTE ALS INSTITUTION 12–13 (1965). 
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claims that the Internet has become the dominant distribution medium 
because it is the only such medium that fits the needs of a hypercomplex 
society.105 Arguably there are two reasons for this. First, the Internet is the 
distribution medium which is best equipped for complexity management 
under conditions of double contingency. Second, the Internet promises 
global reach, which is essential for a society that has, according to 
Luhmann, become a world society.106 We have seen that the development 
towards Web 2.0107 functionality allows these two points to appear to be 
inherently linked.108 Indeed, network hyper connectivity gives complexity 
an additional boost and makes it even more urgent to develop strategies to 
reduce it. On the other hand, the viability of such strategies now increasingly 
depends on a few transnational platform corporations, including Google, 
Apple, Facebook and Amazon, each of them globally occupying dominant 
market positions. 109 As designers of artificially intelligent algorithms, 
operators of the Internet’s essential information networks and colonizers of 
the Big Data space, they possess pervasive regulatory power.110 
To valuate Qvortrup’s thesis about the Internet’s complexity 
management function within autopoiesis theory we have to return to 
Luhmann’s concept of communication as the synthesis of the selections of 
utterance, information and understanding. In order to understand the 
Internet’s communicative impact as a distribution medium, the distinction 
between the selections of information and understanding is paramount. As 
no communication is able to observe the other’s selection of understanding, 
communication processes are characterized by double contingency. The 
only thing that a second communication can observe is the first 
communication’s selections of utterance/information and vice versa.111 The 
modalities of this selection depend on technology. The question to focus on 
in the following sections is how the management of communicative 
complexity interrelates with the technical particularities of a society’s 
dominant distribution medium.   
 
 
 
105 See QVORTRUP, supra note 68, at 169. 
106 See Niklas Luhmann, Globalization or World Society: How to Conceive of Modern Society?, 7 
INT’L REV. SOC. 67 (1997). 
107 For a definition see infra note 129 and accompanying text. 
108 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
109 See Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133 (2017). 
110 See INT’L PANEL ON SOC. PROGRESS, supra note 91, at 31; FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX 
SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015); Julie E. 
Cohen, The Biopolitical Public Domain: The Legal Construction of the Surveillance Economy, 30 PHIL. 
& TECH. 1 (2017). 
111 See QVORTRUP, supra note 68, at 169. 
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PART III: A. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DISTRIBUTION MEDIA AND 
SOCIAL COMPLEXITY 
From a historical perspective it is possible to identify correlations 
between types of social organization and types of distribution media. In a 
segmented society, which is based on oral communication, memory is the 
dominant distribution medium. Memory serves the purposes of small-scale 
societies well where communication takes place face to face between people 
that are connected in time and space.112 
In everyday language and mainstream academic literature, 
communication is attributed to persons and individual actions. For 
methodological reasons it is thus necessary to clarify how references to 
individual actions are conceived in Luhmann’s theory. While we have seen 
that it is only social systems that communicate, the operation of the 
communication can be distinguished from the observation of the 
communication at a second level. Within interaction systems, for example, 
it is possible at the second level to observe the operation of a structural 
coupling between the consciousnesses of the psychic systems and the living 
bodies of those participating in the communication.113 Accordingly, actions 
of participants in the communication are the result of a reconstruction of the 
communication at level of observation and its attribution to persons. The 
concept of person, then again, does not refer to human beings in their quality 
as psychic or organic systems but to points of communicative identification 
that are internally created by the social system. Persons are thus 
communicative artifacts. Actions of persons are constituted through 
attribution and are the result of observations and descriptions within social 
systems.114 
If we thus observe a face-to-face communication between persons A 
and B, the only trace of their interaction will be in their memories. We see 
that B observes A’s utterance/information selection and understands it in a 
certain way. Whether B’s understanding corresponds with A’s 
communication is likely to show in B’s next communication through 
statements of confirmation or correction. Mnemonic techniques, such as 
singing and storytelling in Aboriginal Australia,115 enable the tradition of 
information being passed from generation to generation and thus 
 
 
112 See 1 THOMAS VESTING, SPRACHE, DIE MEDIEN DES RECHTS 81–118 (2011). 
113 See LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY, supra note 64, at 227. 
114 See LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 18, at 165–66. 
115 See RONALD M. BERNDT & CATHERINE H. BERNDT, THE SPEAKING LAND: MYTH AND STORY 
IN ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIA (1994); BRUCE CHATWIN, THE SONGLINES (1998); JILL STUBINGTON, 
SINGING THE LAND: THE POWER OF PERFORMANCE IN ABORIGINAL LIFE (2007). 
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contributing to cultural “storage” in the collective memory.116 The 
innovation of script then provided for an externalized memory117 and 
permitted discontinuities in time and space.118 Script allowed 
communication between people who were remote from each other but—in 
the case of shipping letters, for example—made the correction of errors 
more time-consuming than oral communication.  
It was only with the spread of the printing press in the fifteenth century 
that a more complex form of social organization became possible, which 
was based on functional differentiation. From a historical perspective, the 
emergence of the printing press played a key role in the transformation from 
segmented or stratified forms of social organization to functional 
differentiation.119 Luhmann, though, insists that the relationship between 
distribution media and symbolically generalized communication media is 
not a unilaterally deterministic one but rather one of mutual 
interdependencies.120  
 
PART III: B. AFFORDANCES, COMMUNICATIVE SELECTIONS AND 
SMART TECHNOLOGIES 
The question is, generally, how material affordances of distribution 
media affect “understanding control”—that is, the mutual verification of 
interpretations between sender and receiver.121 The printing press afforded 
the author of a newspaper article or book the opportunity to reach out to 
potentially large audiences although the selections of information and 
understanding were decoupled, and responses from the receiver were rather 
unlikely. Elizabeth Eisenstein showed in The Printing Revolution in Early 
Modern Europe that the mechanical reproduction of multiple copies and the 
availability of large quantities of printed materials at a relatively low price 
required the development of complexity-reduction strategies—including 
rationalization and systematization—as a response to an excess of 
information.122 The spread of the printing press also had a great impact on 
 
 
116 See HILDEBRANDT, supra note 13, at 175 (2015). 
117 See JAN ASSMANN, CULTURAL MEMORY AND EARLY CIVILIZATION (Henry Wilson trans., 
2011) (1992); see also 2 THOMAS VESTING, SCHRIFT, DIE MEDIEN DES RECHTS 49–88 (2011). 
118 See Luhmann, The Form of Writing, supra note 62, at 25–42, 29, 40. 
119 See LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY, supra note 64, at 174–180. 
120 See id. at 193–94. 
121 See QVORTRUP, supra note 68, at 172. 
122 See ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING REVOLUTION IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE (2d 
ed. 2005); see also MICHAEL GIESECKE, DER BUCHDRUCK IN DER FRÜHEN NEUZEIT (1991); 3 Thomas 
Vesting, BUCHDRUCK, DIE MEDIEN DES RECHTS (2013); Anne Blair, Reading Strategies for Coping 
with Information Overload ca. 1550-1700, 64 J. HIST. IDEAS 11 (2003). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
242 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 10:221 
 
 
society at large as it was a precondition for functional differentiation. In the 
legal system, for example, the printing press was a factor accelerating the 
codification of private law123 as well as the appearance of written 
constitutions124 in Western Europe, and the development of a commercial 
value for books generated the need for copyright protection in the form of a 
statute—replacing the old system of printing privileges that mainly served 
the monarch’s censorship purposes.125  
As Qvortrup observes, the distribution media that emerged in the 
twentieth century (such as radio and TV broadcasting, the telephone, and 
the Internet) are all characterized by a physically decoupled relationship 
between the selections of information and understanding.126 However, in 
communicative interactions over the Internet, the physical decoupling 
between receiver and sender is not experienced as such.  Indeed, online 
communication over cross-platform messaging applications and social 
media or interactions with search-engines and so forth seem to dissolve 
space-time distinctions.  
Marshall McLuhan emphasized the differences in terms of 
synchronization between the printing press and electronic media.127 While 
the printing press afforded sequentiality in the communication process, 
electronic media generated simultaneity and configuration.128 Drawing on 
McLuhan, Mireille Hildebrandt argues that simultaneous rather than 
sequential synchronization of “messages sent from different space-time 
configurations” is typical for the Web 1.0 (discrete websites linked through 
hypertext and accessed only via desktop or laptop computers) and the Web 
2.0 (interactive online platforms accessible via multiple devices).129  
The networking of general purpose computers has not only afforded 
real-time remote communication but also the possibility for the platform to 
make decisions and establish control mechanisms “based on unprecedented 
predictive analyses and the simulation of highly complex processes.”130 In 
the era of the printing press our capability to predict the communications or 
actions of other agents was partially enabled by text.131 In the age of the 
 
 
123 See HILDEBRANDT, supra note 13, at 178–79. 
124 See VESTING, supra note 112, at 115. 
125 See PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 127 (1996); Christoph B. 
Graber & Jessica C. Lai, Intellectual Property: Law in Context, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 266, 266 (James D. Wright ed., 2d ed. 2015). 
126 See QVORTRUP, supra note 68, at 172–73. 
127 MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 12–13 (MIT Press 
1994) (1964). 
128 See id. 
129 HILDEBRANDT, supra note 13, at 50; see also INT’L PANEL ON SOC. PROGRESS, supra note 91, 
at 27. 
130 HILDEBRANDT, supra note 13, at 109. 
131 See id. at 58. 
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Internet, predictive algorithms that are connected with the Big Data space 
no longer depend on text as an externalized memory. Rather, operations are 
becoming recursive to the extent that they are using machine learning (ML) 
techniques “that persistently nourish [themselves] on and reconfigure the 
time space of Big Data.”132 Although in the age of the printing press, access 
to texts was often dependent on a reader’s wealth, class affiliation or 
location, institutions such as public libraries eventually provided for 
centralized access points to many relevant publications.133 While ML 
technologies afford unprecedented complexity management, these 
technologies are unequally distributed within society. ML technologies are 
expensive to develop as they depend on the availability of large amounts of 
training data, which are concentrated in the hands of giant platform 
corporations such as Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and others.134  
The affordances of Internet-based smart technologies entail 
asymmetric opacity in the communication process between platform and 
user. While ML and Big Data afford a platform to predict and influence a 
user’s selection of understanding, the user will often not be aware that a 
profile has been applied to him. According to Hildebrandt, “[s]mart 
technologies are capable of anticipating us and of acting upon that, to test 
the accuracy of their anticipation.”135 It is nothing new that artifacts 
represent or embody social relations,136 but the combination of computer 
systems that pre-empt our intent and ML-supported personalization 
technologies afford platform corporations with unprecedented power to 
discriminate and manipulate users without their knowing.137 Responses 
from the impact constituency become unlikely because the platforms 
monopolize the Big Data space with the effect that information that would 
be necessary for training algorithms (as counter artifacts) is enclosed in 
private silos rather than circulating freely for the benefit of society at large. 
The danger is “designification”, as the technological drama drops out of 
smart technologies. 
 
 
 
132 Mireille Hildebrandt, Location Data, Purpose Binding and Contextual Integrity: What’s the 
Message?, in PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY — A NEW EQUILIBRIUM? 31, 
35–36 (Luciano Floridi ed., 2014). 
133 See LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY, supra note 64, at 178–79. On public libraries in England, 
see RICHARD D. ALTICK, THE ENGLISH COMMON READER: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE MASS READING 
PUBLIC, 1800-1900, at ch. 10 (2d ed. 1998). 
134 See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Digital Economy 
Outlook 2017, at 295–306, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264276284-en. 
135 HILDEBRANDT, supra note 13, at 123. 
136 See BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN (1993). 
137 HILDEBRANDT, supra note 13, at 95–96. 
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PART IV: CONSEQUENCES FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS THEORY 
AND FREEDOM OF THE INTERNET 
 
Building on the assumptions established in earlier Parts, this Part 
discusses the implications for fundamental rights theory in general and the 
need to recognize a new fundamental freedom that specifically protects the 
Internet as an institution.  Guided by Luhmann’s theory of fundamental 
rights, it advances a theory of fundamental rights that is capable of coping 
with the modern-day challenges of the Internet. 
 
PART IV: A. LUHMANN’S THEORY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
In building a theory of fundamental rights for the Internet, it is 
instructive to consider how Luhmann understood the role of fundamental 
rights in society.  Luhmann’s major work on the topic is Grundrechte als 
Institution (Fundamental Rights as an Institution),138 a 1965 book that has— 
despite its huge impact on constitutional rights theory in both the social 
sciences and the law—so far not been translated into English. Although 
fundamental rights are covered by Luhmann’s later monographs on the legal 
system,139 Grundrechte als Institution is the only separate study on the topic. 
The book’s main thesis is that fundamental rights are institutions of society 
that have emerged as a result of an evolutionary process of modernization 
with the function of protecting functional differentiation against society’s 
self-destructing tendencies. Fundamental rights are thus conceived as 
historically contingent social institutions that are related to society’s 
dominant structure of functional differentiation. As already discussed, in the 
process of functional differentiation autonomous spheres of meaning (or 
discourses) with their own symbolically generalized communication media, 
such as money, scientific truth, law, power, faith and so forth, have 
emerged. Fundamental rights protect society’s own form of social 
organization against the dangers of de-differentiation, which can result—as 
Graber and Teubner argue—not only from the state but from any expanding 
social system.140 Accordingly, they protect the autonomy of social 
discourses against the ever present self-destructive tendencies within 
society, emanating from totalizing social systems.141 While the state, as the 
 
 
138 NIKLAS LUHMANN, GRUNDRECHTE ALS INSTITUTION, supra note 104. 
139 Among the works that have been translated into English, the following stand out: NIKLAS 
LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 77, and NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL 
THEORY OF LAW (Taylor and Francis 2013) (1980). 
140 See Christoph B. Graber & Gunther Teubner, Art and Money: Constitutional Rights in the 
Private Sphere, 18 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 65 (1998). 
141  See id. at 69–70. 
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self-description of the political system, has historically been the primary 
culprit, today the systems of science, economy and religion also display 
expansionist tendencies.  
This is obviously the point where Luhmann’s theory undertakes a 
change of perspective from a mere description of empirical facts to 
prescribing a normative aim: the protection of functional differentiation. 
With regard to the question of how we can know what the “best of all 
possible worlds” would be, Luhmann would certainly have more sympathy 
with Voltaire’s Candide than with Leibniz’s Monadology. Rather than 
referring to any metaphysical or natural law based justification, Luhmann 
develops his normative ideal from empirical observation of social evolution. 
We cannot know how the “next society”142 will look, but we know that, 
historically, functional differentiation brought about unprecedented gains in 
individual freedom and social autonomy. Although the current development 
of society may carry the risk of the end of functional differentiation, and 
certain empirical facts may already be pointing in that direction, we have no 
choice other than to contrafactually pursue functional differentiation as the 
overriding aim of social policy. 
In addition to protecting functional differentiation, fundamental rights 
also protect autonomous communicative spheres of individuals who have 
been emancipated from the constraints of pre-modern social structures.143 
As a result of modernization, individuals are no longer subject to total 
inclusion into kingdoms, guilds, the church, families and so forth but are 
free to participate in multiple communicative systems and to take different 
roles in different situations. Individuals become bearers of subjective rights 
that protect this autonomy. Subjective fundamental rights can therefore be 
seen as a kind of compensation for the loss of total inclusion into a segment 
or stratum of a pre-modern type of social organization,144 and human rights, 
strictly speaking, protect the mental and physical integrity of human beings 
against markedly “destructive perturbations of communication.”145 
According to Luhmann, fundamental rights are, first and foremost, 
institutions of society.146 They become institutions of the law only after 
 
 
142 DIRK BAECKER, STUDIEN ZUR NÄCHSTEN GESELLSCHAFT 169–74 (2007). 
143 See LUHMANN, GRUNDRECHTE ALS INSTITUTION, supra note 104, at 53–83; see also Gert 
Verschraegen, Human Rights and Modern Society: A Sociological Analysis from the Perspective of 
Systems Theory, 29 J. L. & SOC’Y 258, 263–64 (2002). 
144 See LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 77, at 417. 
145 Gunther Teubner, The Anonymous Matrix: Human Rights Violations by ‘Private’ Transnational 
Actors, 69 MOD. L. REV. 327, 335 (2006) (citing LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 77, 
at 485). 
146 See LUHMANN, GRUNDRECHTE ALS INSTITUTION, supra note 104, at 13. 
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having been reformulated in the language of the law. This sociological 
theory of fundamental rights contrasts starkly with classic theories of law 
and political science, constructing fundamental and human rights within 
frameworks of natural law or political liberalism.147 Those theories 
conceptualize fundamental and human rights as a category of constitutional 
norms whose purpose it is to protect the individual against the power of the 
nation state. From a sociological perspective, such a reductionist 
understanding of fundamental rights, within a triad of 
individual/power/state, misses their full emancipatory potential in today’s 
hypercomplex society. This is highly problematic because in the networked 
ecology some of the most important constitutional questions are not posed 
by an expanding political system and state actions,148 but, rather, originate 
from the totalizing tendencies of the economic system and some of its 
organizations. These include transnationally acting Internet platforms and 
telecommunication corporations, which are creating hybrid worlds of 
governance deeply impacting on people’s rights and freedoms. 
It is not the case that no efforts have been made in constitutional rights 
doctrine to somewhat loosen the grip of classic liberal theory. In the United 
States, the state action doctrine has extended constitutional rights disciplines 
to private actors who have either performed a public function or are so close 
to the government that a clear distinction between public and private is not 
possible.149 In the continental European legal tradition, a theory of the 
horizontal effects of fundamental rights has been championed to extend the 
reach of constitutional rights to private actors.150 However, from a 
sociological perspective, seeking to develop constructs that allow holding 
private individuals accountable is missing the point of fundamental 
rights.151 One does not need fundamental rights for this; private law—tort—
or penal law will do. Rather, the question should be: what expansive social 
systems threaten individual and social autonomies and how is this related to 
the current technological conditions of society’s self-reproduction? We 
have seen that organizations are a type of social system that are 
distinguished within Luhmann’s theory. Platforms are organizations of the 
economic system equipped with smart technologies, vast data silos, 
specialist knowledge and the economic means to colonize individual and 
 
 
147 See Graber & Teubner, supra note 140, at 63. 
148 See Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional 
Theory?, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 3, 4–5 (Christian Joerges, et al. 
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social autonomies towards de-differentiation. Accordingly, the economic 
system and its organizations should be at the centre of attention in research 
related to protecting freedom under the conditions of the Internet. The 
concept of freedom, as used in this Article, refers to a set of normative 
expectations related to a sphere of individual or social autonomy, the 
boundaries of which cannot be demarcated irrespective of concrete contexts 
of infringement, and which is dependent on technological affordances and 
social capabilities. 
While it is one thing to ask, “against what do fundamental rights offer 
protection?” it is also necessary to clarify what falls into their scope of 
protection. Regarding this second question, learning from a law and society 
approach to fundamental rights does not require getting rid of the existing 
achievements of courts and other bodies in fundamental or human rights 
practice. According to Luhmann, fundamental rights guarantee protection 
on two different levels. First, fundamental rights protect individual 
autonomies of human beings as psychic systems and holders of roles—
individual dimension. Second, fundamental rights protect the autonomy of 
social discourses—institutional dimension. 
With regard to the first level, standards of fundamental and human 
rights protection of individuals, as beings with minds and bodies and actors 
in diverse social contexts, have been codified and are continually being 
further developed in the practice of national and international courts. 
Freedom of expression and information, and the right to privacy and data 
protection are of particular importance for individuals in the age of data-
driven smart technologies.152 In the realm of human rights advocacy and 
policymaking, efforts to extend the reach of existing guarantees of 
communicative freedom or privacy to the Internet realm are being widely 
discussed. An impressive number of attempts to craft an “Internet Bill of 
Rights” have been made over the last twenty-five years, mainly by various 
civil society organizations, business corporations, multi-stakeholder 
dynamics, public international institutions and government agencies.153 
 
 
152 See U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur David Kaye on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/38 
(May 11, 2016). 
153 See, e.g., Giovanna De Minico, Towards an Internet Bill of Rights, 37 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. 
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This Article does not want to add a further piece to this already rich 
body of literature. Rather, its focus will be on the institutional dimension, 
the protection of autonomous social discourses under the conditions of a 
networked digital ecosystem. It will address a question that, until now, has 
received too little attention: whether the Internet should be protected as an 
institution. 
 
PART IV: B. AFFORDANCES AND NORMATIVE EXPECTATIONS 
Luhmann stands out as a scholar who has been very sensitive towards 
the vulnerability of social order in a hypercomplex society. More than any 
other social theorist he is aware that social order is unlikely under the current 
conditions of contingency and complexity. Since complexity has reached 
unprecedented levels in the face of data-driven smart technologies, and the 
totalizing tendencies of transnational Internet platform corporations are a 
looming threat,154 Luhmann’s fundamental rights theory is more topical 
now than it has ever been. Luhmann emphasizes that the structures of the 
functionally differentiated society have emerged as a highly improbable 
result of social evolution and these structures need protection because the 
danger of de-differentiation is real. Historically, fundamental rights 
emerged in the eighteenth century as counter-institutions against the 
colonizing tendencies of the political system and the state. While the state 
was the only totalizing system until the second half of the twentieth century, 
that is a mere historical contingency.155 As already mentioned, fundamental 
rights are not only directed against political power and the state, they offer 
protection against any totalizing tendencies of social systems. 
Considering the entangled relationship between communication and 
the Internet, a fundamental right protecting society’s dominant distribution 
medium against colonization seems paramount. When I use the words 
“Internet” or “net” in this context, this is meant to refer to the network 
infrastructure that we currently know, without precluding hitherto unknown 
technological changes. This infrastructure can be compared to a kind of 
“engine room” of today’s society—a metaphor suggesting the outstanding 
importance of the net for any type of communication and implying that 
decisions taken at this level have repercussions for communicative freedom 
throughout society. Fundamental rights are those institutions of society 
where normative expectations about the protection of individual and social 
autonomies under varying conditions of the natural or technological 
environment are bundled.  
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The question is how normative expectations about technologies and 
their affordances emerge. We have seen that technologies have affordances 
that are co-determined in recursive practices of material design and social 
interpretation. The social response to material design is an expression of 
cognitive or normative expectations. According to Luhmann, behavioural 
expectations are defined as cognitive or normative depending on whether 
they are given up after having been disappointed.156 While cognitive 
expectations can be given up and thus allow learning from disappointment, 
normative expectations are upheld even in cases where they are breached. 
The expectation, for example, that nobody will steal individual property will 
be upheld even though theft happens frequently. Normative expectations 
can become legal norms if they are contrafactually stabilized.157 In the sense 
of the technological drama, an impact constituency may develop cognitive 
or normative expectations regarding a technology’s affordances. If such 
expectations are normative they will imply that a certain interpretation of a 
technology’s functioning will be considered as a must.  
Normative expectations about new technologies usually emerge from 
the grass-roots level. As detailed elsewhere with regard to net neutrality,158 
normative expectations regarding the design of the Internet have been 
emerging bottom-up from a specific sub-system of society. In a reflexive 
process within the economic system, between actors of the organized 
professional sphere—corporations and other formal organizations—and the 
spontaneous sphere—civil society groups—expectations related to 
preserving an open and neutral Internet have come out. In a second stage 
these normative expectations have been reformulated as legal norms and are 
about to enter the legal system.159 In the United States, an element 
contributing to the juridification160 of net neutrality was the decision of the 
Court of Appeals of the DC Circuit of June 14, 2016 to uphold an earlier 
FCC Decision stating that net neutrality was a legal norm.161 This stage of 
institutionalization of net neutrality as a constitutional right is of course far 
from being completed as it is not clear how the political and legal systems 
in the United States will respond to the Trump presidency. Even when a 
juridification process is accomplished, constitutional structures would have 
 
 
156 See LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 77, at 147–48. 
157 See id. at 149. 
158 See Graber, supra note 84, at 524–52. 
159 For an in-depth discussion see Graber, supra note 84. 
160 “Juridification” is a term used in Legal Sociology to describe the re-formulation of normative 
expectations in the language of the law. See 2 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE 
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to be developed in a next step, according to Gunther Teubner’s theory of 
societal constitutionalism.162 The acknowledgement by a constitutional 
court of net neutrality as a fundamental right of a nation’s constitution 
would be a step to complete the process of bottom-up 
constitutionalization.163  
A further realm where normative expectations regarding the Internet’s 
affordances may emerge is the process of online communication. What is at 
issue are people’s normative expectations that their communications over 
the Internet will not be manipulated through opaque third-party 
interferences. A concept that needs to be introduced at this point is the 
communicative in-between. The “in-between” plays an important role in 
Hildebrandt’s theorizing about smart technologies’ impact on the private 
sphere of human beings. Inspired by her studies of politeness and privacy 
practices in Japan, Hildebrandt interprets the “in-between” as an “emptiness 
of the space that holds us apart while constituting us.”164 The “in-between” 
is thus a virtual empty space in communicative interactions between 
humans. It establishes a minimal distance between participants in 
communicative interactions, which is a prerequisite for a human being’s 
self-identification. Hildebrandt considers pre-emptive computing to be 
dangerous as it “occupies the ‘in-between’ with projections and inferences 
to which we have little access.”165 The danger is an “overdetermination” by 
computational decision-making that will pre-empt our intent and thus 
colonize the “in-between.” 
Hildebrandt’s work focuses on privacy as a subjective fundamental 
right that users can bring to the fore against the negative effects of pre-
emptive technologies thereon. In my view, the importance of the concept of 
the “in-between” should not be limited to the right to privacy and individual 
effects of fundamental rights. The concept is relevant beyond the right to 
privacy and data protection as it refers to the integrity of the communication 
process. If reformulated within Luhmann’s communication theory, the “in-
between” would be conceived as referring to a space-time emptiness in the 
decoupled but quasi-simultaneous selections of information and 
understanding in the chain of communications. As pre-emptive computing 
invades the communicative in-between while lacking transparency, it has 
 
 
162 See GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS 110–13 (Gareth Norbury trans., 2012). 
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the effect of violating the integrity of this emptiness.  
Without explicitly using this term, communicative integrity is a 
normative principle that has first been recognized in a famous decision of 
the German Constitutional Court of 2008.166 There, the Court held that 
people relying on information technology systems for their communication 
should be protected in their expectations of the technological integrity of 
those systems.167 This is a landmark decision because this expectation is a 
prerequisite for people’s ability to enjoy their communicative freedom 
online.168 Communicative integrity is a broader concept than net neutrality 
as it is possible to violate communicative integrity under conditions with or 
without net neutrality. In this Article, communicative integrity is defined as 
the absence of non-transparent interferences with an existing information 
technological system, whereas net neutrality is more about the design of a 
telecommunications infrastructure. The German Constitutional Court’s 
ruling is limited in scope as it is restricted to state actions.169 There is, 
however, an obvious similarity between the measures or software that the 
Court was trying to protect against and the technologies that platform 
organizations use to monitor or even manipulate Internet users’ online 
behaviour. 
The next section discusses how these two sets of emerging normative 
expectations about the Internet’s communicative affordances — net 
neutrality and communicative integrity — can be reformulated in the 
framework of Luhmann’s theory of fundamental rights as institutions of 
society. 
PART IV: C. FREEDOM OF THE NET 
Freedom of the net is the provisional name for a fundamental right that 
protects the Internet as an institution. Building on the analysis in the 
previous section, two points about the institutional, trans-subjective 
dimension of this freedom must be made. First, freedom of the net should 
guarantee protection against a colonization of the communicative time-
space “in-between” of the net, which is decisive for protecting the integrity 
of the communication process. As we have seen, a few organizations that 
control data-driven smart technologies are able to materially interfere with 
 
 
166 See Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) [Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BvR 
370/07 (Feb. 27, 2008), paras. 100 & 135, 
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167 See id. at paras. 181 & 203-207. 
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the process of communication as the synthesis of the selections of utterance, 
information and understanding. Acting as “intermediaries” in a strict sense 
of the term, these platforms are in a position to technically manipulate the 
global “flows of social and public knowledge.”170 What is more, data-driven 
agency of platforms tends to manipulate and ultimately pervert the 
communication process since meaningful human information is replaced by 
meaningless machine-generated information, as Hildebrandt argues. This is 
because smart technologies may well be called intelligent but what 
distinguishes them from human beings is meaning. The human way of 
existence is characterized by the ability to react on meaningful realities, to 
relate them to past experiences and the emotions that they have left behind 
and to deliberate on their relative importance in discourses with other 
human beings. While human beings are born with the gift to act mindfully, 
computers are only able to simulate mindfulness. Meaning depends on how 
data is interwoven with our life world. The information, however, that smart 
algorithms are producing remains meaningless, even when ML and AI “are 
capable of second order preferences and higher order decision-making.”171 
According to Hildebrandt, “we should admit that most of the information 
that is around now is meaningless, but highly influential.”172 It is influential 
because what data-driven technologies consider to be relevant will become 
relevant in the real life of human beings.173 
Second, freedom of the net should guarantee that the network’s 
affordances serve society’s needs of complexity reduction. What is at stake 
is society’s autonomy of technological self-representation in the networked 
environment. This is a point that relates to decisions about the design of the 
network infrastructure. Freedom of the net should thus safeguard the 
network’s openness and malleability in response to society’s requests for 
complexity reduction and inclusiveness. The net should remain open for 
new platforms, applications, search engines and entirely new devices and 
services. This goes beyond a competition law perspective and resonates 
more with the old claim that the “pipe” should remain “stupid” so that many 
types of hardware and software can be used to distribute data over the 
network.174 It also includes a non-discrimination rule, which is encapsulated 
by the principle of net neutrality. In the United States for example, the FCC 
interpreted this principle in a decision of February 26, 2015 as a prohibition 
on providers of fixed and wireless Internet access discriminating between 
 
 
170 INT’L PANEL ON SOC. PROGRESS, supra note 91, at 66. 
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173 See id. at 197. 
174 See BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION 107–08 (2010); 
David Isenberg, The Dawn of the “Stupid Network,” 2 NETWORKER 24 (1998). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss2/5
  
 
 
 
 
2018]               FREEDOM AND AFFORDANCES OF THE NET               253 
 
 
 
 
types of content that are distributed over the Internet and thus to abstain 
from blocking, throttling or paid prioritization practices.175 While the debate 
on net neutrality in a narrow sense of the word refers to Internet Service 
Providers’ (ISPs) control of the network infrastructure,176 the case of 
Facebook’s Free Basics in India shows that the role of platform firms should 
not be ignored in this context. In 2013, Facebook launched the Free Basics 
(originally branded Internet.org) initiative, arguably with the philanthropic 
intention of extending free Internet access to first-time users in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America.177 When implemented in 2015 in India, Free Basics 
(then Internet.org) was running over an “app” on mobile devices that 
granted free access to only a select number of sites. Coordinated critique 
from more than 65 civil society organisations around the world178 eventually 
forced Facebook to extend its offer (under the new name of Free Basics) to 
a larger number of websites, provided that they respected the corporation’s 
terms of access and technical regulations. The set-up required a deal 
between Facebook and RCom, its Indian telecom partner,179 that provided 
access to the “walled garden”180 over its mobile network. Even if 
Facebook’s claims are true that it never paid RCom for its services181 it 
indirectly paid with its own brand, helping the partner ISP to advertise its 
services.182 In return, the exclusive deal helped Facebook to increase the 
popularity of its brand with the effect of distorting the market and hurting 
start-ups and other competitors.183 What is more, Facebook received access 
to a market of 1 billion mobile users (and their data) with low Internet access 
penetration.184 Free Basics India came to an end on February 8, 2016 after 
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TRAI — the Indian Telecom Regulator — barred telecom service providers 
from charging differential rates for data services. TRAI’s decision, justified 
with reference to the net neutrality principle, was a response to massive civil 
society protests against Facebook’s plans.185 The civil society campaign led 
by SaveTheInternet.in mostly took issue with Facebook’s attempt to “tether 
users to its product and monopolize the terms of access to the wider Internet, 
so compromising the tenets of network neutrality.”186  
While the principle of net neutrality is important and much can be 
learned from its regulatory history in several jurisdictions, network 
infrastructure openness is broader and should extend to AI openness. 
Although research on AI openness is at a very early stage, there are 
influential voices arguing that a competitive situation between AI 
developers would be beneficial from a public policy perspective.187 In terms 
of policy goals, data openness is considered to be even more important than 
equal access to algorithms or source code.188 This has to do with the already 
mentioned fact that large data sets are required to make algorithms more 
effective. Questions going beyond the scope of this Article refer to the many 
regulatory issues that such a policy scenario would trigger. What this Article 
suggests is that the overarching regulatory goal should be to prevent AI 
designification and to make sure that the technological drama continues. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Article has been to show that from a further 
development of the material side of Luhmann’s sociological systems theory, 
and marriage with a theory of technological affordances, important new 
insights can be gained for the role of technology and the Internet in the 
theory of fundamental rights. While it is true that technological materialities 
in general, and the Internet in particular, do not occupy a particularly 
prominent position in Luhmann’s writings, it would be a fatal 
misunderstanding to conclude that autopoiesis theory is “technologically 
blind” or unfit to analyse technology-induced challenges for contemporary 
society and its legal system. Luhmann’s theory is constructed as a theory of 
communication involving decisions about the theory’s design that have 
certain implications. One implication is that the theory’s elements are not 
atoms or agents (human or artificial) or language, but communications. 
Luhmann’s definition of communication as the synthesis of the 
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selections of utterance, information and understanding is the starting point 
to developing a material extension of autopoiesis theory and linking up with 
a theory of affordances. One of the autopoiesis theory’s important themes 
refers to the correlation between societal complexity and the distribution 
medium that is dominant in a given society. Accordingly, the Internet has 
become the dominant distribution medium of contemporary society because 
it is the only medium capable of coping with hypercomplexity. The point is 
that the Internet has affordances that increase social complexity while at the 
same time offering mechanisms of complexity management. 
Affordance is a concept that allows the relationship between 
materiality and sociality to be conceived in a way that avoids the ideological 
constrictions of both technological determinism and social constructivism. 
The former conceives technology as something that determines how it can 
be used in society and wants to make us believe that society is at 
technology’s mercy. Conversely, the perspective of social constructivism 
starts from the (opposite) premise that technology is just a social construct 
and that it is always society that shapes a technology. Distinct from both 
extremes, the theory of affordance—fleshed out with the help of 
Pfaffenberger’s technological drama and applied to digital artifacts—shows 
how the relationship between technology and society is one of reciprocity 
and mutual influence rather than unilateral determination or construction. 
Such a theory allows us to see that the Internet as a distribution medium 
affords communication that is simultaneous and ubiquitous at the same 
time. As with other electronic media of the twentieth century, the Internet 
decouples the relationships between information and understanding. Yet, 
the combination with Machine Learning (ML) and Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) engenders profound structural changes in online communication, as 
opaque control mechanisms interfere with the relationship between 
information and understanding. The spread of ML and AI technologies 
jeopardizes the integrity of communicative selections to the extent that 
mutual interpretation is replaced by unilateral predictions and simulations 
without this being sufficiently transparent. 
Luhmann’s theory is primarily descriptive. A change of perspective is 
involved when an autopoiesis theory–informed analysis switches from the 
observation and description of socio-technological interactions to normative 
conclusions in the realm of the law. Within fundamental rights theory a step 
from “is” to “ought” can be reconstructed as the emergence and subsequent 
juridification of normative expectations. Empirical research about net 
neutrality confirms that normative expectations related to the functioning of 
the Internet as an essential communicative infrastructure are emerging 
bottom-up, from the middle of society. Juridification occurs, in a second 
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step, if these normative expectations are being reformulated in the language 
of the law. An ensuing constitutionalization of juridified norms would 
require a reflexive process within the law, involving a second order 
observation applying a distinction juxtaposing the values “constitutional” 
and “unconstitutional.” 
The new smart technologies afford platform companies to take 
decisions and manipulate behaviour through predictions of users’ 
communications and actions. For their part, users will not be aware when 
the integrity of their communicative selections is violated through ML and 
AI driven control interventions and simulations. The communicative in-
between is introduced as a normative concept referring to a virtual time-
space interval that needs to be protected against manipulation to secure 
users’ expectations in the integrity of online communication. 
Text as an externalized memory of communication is being replaced 
with ML technologies that continuously re-actualize time-space 
relationships in the Big Data space. Although ML affords highly effective 
complexity management, the availability of such strategies is potentially 
limited to platform companies that are able to train algorithms with large 
stocks of data. Control over Big Data and intelligent algorithms thus 
becomes a topic of social policy. 
From a normative perspective, fundamental rights need to protect 
functional differentiation and individual and social autonomies in a 
technology-neutral way — that is, irrespective of what a society’s dominant 
dissemination medium looks like. While such a normative conclusion has 
been drawn in the present article with respect to the specific problem of 
protecting freedom of the net, more general questions regarding the 
determination of a normative aim in a socio-legal theory will be clarified in 
a forthcoming book. 
To summarize, a convergence between autopoiesis theory, affordance 
theory and fundamental rights theory leads to the conclusion that 
fundamental rights protection in a hypercomplex society needs to include 
affordances of the digital ecosystem. Freedom of the net should first protect 
the integrity of Internet-based communication against opaque interferences 
from organizations of the economic system. Second, freedom of the net 
should protect society’s expectations about the Internet’s capacity for 
complexity management. This postulate refers to society’s technological 
self-representation and decisions about the network’s design. Overall, law 
(and ensuing regulation) should ensure that the technological drama does 
not drop out of the Internet. 
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